


Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.



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**IN THE  
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA**

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ROBERT F. KECK and  
JANET L. RUSSELL,  
  
Appellants-Plaintiffs,

vs.

MARY ANN WALKER, Individually and as  
Personal Representative of the Estate of Edith M.  
Dawdy, SUNMAN COMMUNITY CHURCH,  
SUNMAN LIFE SQUAD, SUNMAN FIRE  
DEPARTMENT, ST. PAUL'S CEMETERY,  
ST. NICHOLAS CEMETERY FUND, BILL  
FRAZIER, EDITH ZIMMER, LESLIE  
ROBINSON, MARILEE HUNTER, WILBUR  
LUERS, NANCY GUTAPFEL, VIRGINIA  
TRAUTMAN, VIOLA BRUNS, ANGELA  
PROBST, AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY -  
LOWER EASTERN AREA a/k/a THE RIPLEY  
COUNTY CANCER FUND, THE HEART  
ASSOCIATION a/k/a THE RIPLEY COUNTY  
HEART FUND, THE AMERICAN DIABETES  
ASSOCIATION a/k/a THE RIPLEY COUNTY  
DIABETES FOUNDATION and  
THE MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS ASSOCIATION,

Appellees-Defendants.

No. 69A04-0710-CV-590

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APPEAL FROM THE RIPLEY CIRCUIT COURT  
The Honorable Carl H. Taul, Judge  
Cause No. 69C01-0608-PL-7

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**June 13, 2008**

**MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

**MAY, Judge**

Robert F. Keck and Janet L. Russell claim they are entitled to property devised to their mother, Luella Keck, in the will of Edith M. Dawdy. The trial court concluded the devise lapsed and granted summary judgment for Dawdy's personal representative and the other beneficiaries of her will ("Appellees"). Keck and Russell filed a motion to correct error, which was denied. They appeal from that order. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

**FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

Dawdy executed a will that named her cousin, Luella Keck, as a residuary beneficiary. Luella passed away on July 8, 1995, but Dawdy executed two codicils after Luella's death that continued to include Luella as a beneficiary. Dawdy passed away on April 28, 2006. Her will and the two codicils were admitted to probate on May 8, 2006. Keck and Russell filed a two-count complaint. Count 1 alleged the will was invalid for various reasons. Count 2 alleged Dawdy executed the codicils knowing Luella was dead and she intended Luella's share to pass to Keck and Russell.

Keck and Russell moved for summary judgment on Count 2. The trial court ruled the devise to Luella lapsed and granted summary judgment for the Appellees. Keck and Russell filed a motion to correct error, which the trial court denied. The trial court then certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal.

### **DISCUSSION AND DECISION**

The Appellees argue the trial court entered a final judgment, and therefore Keck and Russell could not bring this as an interlocutory appeal.<sup>1</sup> The trial court concluded Keck and Walker were not beneficiaries under the terms of Dawdy's will. The Appellees argue that, because Keck and Walker have no standing to challenge the validity of the will, the trial court's order disposed of both counts of their complaint.

Pursuant to Ind. Code § 29-1-7-17, any "interested person" may contest the validity of a will. "Interested persons" include "heirs, devisees, spouses, creditors, or any others having a property right in or claim against the estate." I.C. § 29-1-1-3(13). "Heirs" are "persons, including the surviving spouse, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the real and personal property of a decedent on the decedent's death intestate." I.C. § 29-1-1-3(11).

Keck and Russell are children of Dawdy's first cousin. Pursuant to Ind. Code § 29-1-2-1(d)(6), Keck and Russell are Dawdy's heirs if she left no surviving issue, parent, issue of a parent, or grandparent. The record does not reflect whether that is the case, and

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<sup>1</sup> Keck and Russell argue this issue has been waived because the Appellees did not respond to the motion to certify interlocutory order or the motion to accept jurisdiction of interlocutory appeal. However, subject matter jurisdiction "cannot be waived, and courts are required to consider the issue *sua sponte* if it is not properly raised by the party challenging jurisdiction." *Watkins v. State*, 869 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

there is no indication Keck and Russell have had the opportunity to establish that fact. They moved for summary judgment only on the second count of their complaint, and the trial court's orders do not dispose of the first count of their complaint.

Because the trial court's order was not a final order, Keck and Russell should not have filed a motion to correct error. A "motion to correct error, if any, shall be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the entry of a *final judgment* or an appealable *final order*." Ind. Trial Rule 59(C) (emphasis added). *See also Hubbard v. Hubbard*, 690 N.E.2d 1219, 1220-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (motion to reconsider pursuant to T.R. 53.4 may be made prior to entry of final judgment; after final judgment, a party may file a motion to correct error pursuant to T.R. 59).

Accordingly, Keck and Russell's motion should be viewed as a motion to reconsider. *See id.* (although appellee improperly designated her motion as a motion to reconsider, we treated it as a motion to correct error and considered whether it was proper under T.R. 59). A motion to reconsider does not "extend the time for any further required or permitted action, motion, or proceedings." T.R. 53.4(A). Therefore, Keck and Russell needed to file their motion for certification of interlocutory appeal within thirty days of the summary judgment order. Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B)(1)(a).

The trial court issued its summary judgment order on July 19, 2007. Keck and Russell did not request certification of an interlocutory appeal until September 13, 2007; therefore, it was not timely filed. App. R. 14(B)(1)(a) allows for late filing if the trial court makes a finding that good cause has been shown, but no such finding was made in this case. Our jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals is subject to the procedures outlined

in App. R. 14. App. R. 5(B). Therefore, we should not have accepted jurisdiction, and we now dismiss the appeal.

Dismissed.

RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.